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Abstract
The extent of these powers [...powers to scrutinize proposed legislation before the Northern
Ireland Assembly for its compliance with human rights standards, to assist litigants in bringing
human rights complaints before the courts, and to conduct investigations into matters that give rise
to human rights concerns...advising the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland as to whether any
additional human rights, beyond those to be introduced for the whole of the United Kingdom by
the Human Rights Act 1998, should be included in a Bill of Rights specific to Northern Ireland...],
and their adequacy to the task that the Commission is expected to achieve, will be considered in
more detail later in Parts III and IV of this Essay. Before doing so, however, it is worth examining
the role of human rights commissions generally, and the particular manifestations that they have
hitherto taken in Northern Ireland.Such background information is essential to understanding both
what can be expected from the Commission and the type of problems that it is likely to face.
THE NORTHERN IRELAND
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION
Stephen Livingstone*
"These 'twin' National Institutions could, I sincerely believe,
become a model for other countries which have been and are
still divided by a history of conflict-emanating from reli-
gious or ethnic differences."1
INTRODUCTION
This observation of U.N. High Commissioner for Human
Rights, Mary Robinson, indicates the weight of expectation that
has been placed on the Northern Ireland Human Rights Com-
mission (or "Commission") (and its sister commission to be es-
tablished in the Republic of Ireland). With the exception of the
Policing Commission, none of the new institutions created by
the Belfast Agreement is likely to have so many hopes focused
upon it. Many of the human rights organizations that have
evolved within the past twenty years in Northern Ireland have
indicated that they see the Commission playing a major role in
ensuring that government is "founded on principles of full re-
spect for, and equality of, civil, political, social and cultural
rights."2 Many of the victims of the human rights abuses that
have plagued Northern Ireland over the past thirty years are
likely to look to the Commission for some sort of redress and the
indication that such abuses will not be repeated. As High Com-
missioner Robinson's statement above indicates, interest in what
the Commission does is also likely to extend beyond Northern
Ireland.
The extent to which the Commission is able to fulfil these
hopes may depend on the political climate in which it operates
and the use that it makes of its powers. The latter were sketched
out in the Belfast Agreement but have now been given legislative
* Professor of Human Rights Law, Centre for International and Comparative
Human Rights Law, Queen's University of Belfast.
1. Mary Robinson, U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Speech at
Queen's University of Belfast (Dec. 2, 1998).
2. Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations, Apr. 10, 1998, Constitu-
tional Issues I 1(v) [hereinafter Belfast Agreement].
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expression in the Northern Ireland Act 1998.' They include
powers to scrutinize proposed legislation before the Northern
Ireland Assembly for its compliance with human rights stan-
dards, to assist litigants in bringing human rights complaints
before the courts, and to conduct investigations into matters that
give rise to human rights concerns. The Commission is also
charged with the task of advising the Secretary of State for
Northern Ireland as to whether any additional human rights, be-
yond those to be introduced for the whole of the United King-
dom by the Human Rights Act 1998, 4 should be included in a
Bill of Rights specific to Northern Ireland. The Agreement also
provides for the establishment of an "equivalent" Human Rights
Commission in the Republic of Ireland, and the Northern Ire-
land commission is under an obligation to facilitate the estab-
lishment of a joint Committee of the two commissions.
The extent of these powers, and their adequacy to the task
that the Commission is expected to achieve, will be considered
in more detail later in Parts III and IV of this Essay. Before do-
ing so, however, it is worth examining the role of human rights
commissions generally, and the particular manifestations that
they have hitherto taken in Northern Ireland. Such background
information is essential to understanding both what can be ex-
pected from the Commission and the type of problems that it is
likely to face.
I. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSIONS IN NORTHERN IRELAND:
THE BACKGROUND
A. International Developments
The 1980s and 1990s have witnessed a rapid growth in what
has come to be known as "National Institutions for the Protec-
3. Northern Ireland Act, 1998, ch. 47 (Eng.).
4. Human Rights Act, 1998, ch. 42 (Eng.). The Human Rights Act 1998 will incor-
porate the substantive rights provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights
("ECHR" or "Convention") into United Kingdom law. All public authorities will now be
under an obligation to act in a manner consistent with the enshrined Convention
rights. All legislation passed by the new Northern Irish and Scottish Assemblies are
required (by the Northern Ireland Act 1998 and Scotland Act 1998 respectively) to
comply with the Convention rights as delegated legislation enacted under the authority
of the Westminster Parliament. However, courts have no power to invalidate primary
legislation of the U.K. Parliament for inconsistency with Convention rights and can only
make a "declaration of incompatibility" if they find such inconsistency.
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tion of Human Rights," especially in Africa, Australia, and Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe.5 Although such institutions go under a
variety of names, there is a certain degree of uniformity in their
structure, functions, and powers. Nearly all are established and
funded by government, though composed of members of civil
society rather than politicians or bureaucrats. Their functions
usually include things like investigating alleged violations of
human rights, assisting litigants before national courts or tribu-
nals, promoting public knowledge of human rights, and con-
ducting research. Many have the task of adjudicating on com-
plaints of human rights violations submitted to them,6 while
some are empowered to conduct visits to prisons and other
places of detention.7
The reasons why such commissions are established are di-
verse. One of the first commissions, established in Tanzania in
1966, was expressly designed to function in the circumstances of
a one party state and to provide a means for citizen redress in
the absence of a political opposition.8 More recent commissions
have tended to be established as part of a democratization pro-
cess (especially where the judiciary are considered unable, un-
willing, or too remote from most ordinary people to enforce
human rights) or in response to criticism of a government's
human rights record. The latter reason always raises the risk
that a commission is established primarily as window dressing
and that its otherwise impressive powers may be undermined by
inadequate funding, the appointment of Commissioners sympa-
thetic to the government, or specific limitations on its remit.'
One former member of the U.N. Human Rights Committee has
observed that while the Committee generally welcomed the crea-
tion of such institutions, it regarded the government's attitude
5. See, for example, the Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Com-
mission Act of 1986; the South African Human Rights Commission Act of 1994; Article
51 of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda (1995); Ghana's Commission on
Human Rights and Administrative Justice Act of 1993; and Article 159 of the Constitu-
tion of the Republic of Slovenia (1991).
6. See, for example, the commissions in Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa.
7. See, for example, the Indian commission, which is given this power by Section
12(c) of the Protection of Human Rights Act 1993.
8. See Patrick McAuslan & Yash Ghai, Constitutional Innovation and Political Stability
in Tanzania, 4J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 501 (1966).
9. The Ugandan statute, for example, allows the President to intervene to prevent
any investigation that might prejudice the "security, defense or international relations
of Uganda."
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towards them as a "kind of litmus test of the political will of the
authorities to promote and protect human rights."10
No doubt mindful of these risks, the United Nations, which
has been strongly supportive of the creation of such National
Institutions," sought to produce a set of guidelines on the crea-
tion and operation of such institutions. These were produced at
a conference in Paris in 1991, and the "Paris Principles," subse-
quently adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in
1993, have now become the international standard by which all
national institutions are measured. 2 They state a number of key
criteria for any such national institution. The first is that any
national institution must be clearly independent from govern-
ment. This independence can be achieved by having a clear
legal basis for the Commission, which sets out its mandate and
the duration for which members of the institution are ap-
pointed. The Commission should be appointed from members
of civil society with government representatives involved (if at
all) only in an advisory capacity. 3 Funding that is independent
from government control and adequate to ensure that the Com-
mission has its own premises and staff is also seen as part of this
requirement. Second, the Paris Principles recommend that any
institution have a broad mandate as regards to the type of
human rights issues it considers, and that it engage in a range of
activities, including examining proposed legislation for its con-
formity with human rights standards, drawing the government's
attention to situations of human rights violations, of human
rights education, and contributing to government reports to in-
ternational bodies.14 Third, the Paris Principles set out the
10. See Rein Mullerson, National Institutions on Human Rights: General Princi-
ples and Specific Experiences, unpublished paper submitted to the International Con-
ference on the Establishment of the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission and the
Institution of Ombudsman, Addis Ababa (May 18-22, 1998).
11. The High Commissioner on Human Rights has appointed a special adviser on
National Institutions for the Protection of Human Rights, and in 1995, it published a
comprehensive handbook on the issue. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of
Europe also indicated support in R (97) 14 of the Comm. of Ministers on the Establishment of
Independent National Human Rights Institutions, 602d mtg. (1997).
12. G.A. Res. 48, U.N. GAOR, 85th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/Res/48/134 (1993).
13. The Paris Principles indicate that membership might include representatives
of human rights non-governmental organizations ("NGOs"), trade unions, professional
associations, universities, members of Parliament, and "Trends in Philosophical and
Religious Thought."
14. In respect to the last of these, the Paris Principles indicate that the Commis-
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methods of operation of such institutions. The methods provide
that they should be able to freely consider any matters within
their competence, to hear any persons and to obtain any docu-
ments necessary, to address the public, and to maintain good
relations with NGOs and professional groups. Additional princi-
ples are set out for those institutions that have quasi-jurisdic-
tional competence and the power to examine complaints di-
rectly.
National institutions for the protection of human rights are
not a substitute for adequate laws guaranteeing human rights, an
independent judiciary and bar, a free media, a vibrant human
rights NGO sector, and a government committed to the protec-
tion of human rights. Indeed, although the level of information
on their effectiveness remains low, there is evidence that they
will find it difficult to operate in the absence of such condi-
tions. 1" However, it is clear that they can play an important role
in strengthening the protection of human rights in any society.
The very existence of a commission shows some level of support
for protecting human rights in a state. Where the requirements
set out in the Paris Principles are fulfilled, 6 a commission may
also bring a degree of publicly sanctioned power to bear on a
human rights issue. It may take on more effectively issues that
NGOs lack the resources or authority to examine fully. It may
bring a more disinterested and impartial perspective to an issue
of heated public controversy where the facts or the implications
are bitterly disputed. A commission is also especially well placed
to develop the idea of a rights culture throughout society and to
encourage all public authorities to incorporate human rights
standards into their activities.
The need for such an institution has long been clear in
Northern Ireland. Over the past twenty-five years, a range of dif-
ferent institutions have been established, which play a role in the
sion should be prepared to express an opinion on government reports "with due re-
spect for their independence."
15. As a recent study observes, "Little has yet been written on the effectiveness of
these young institutions and their own literature is generally more descriptive than eval-
uative." SARAH SPENCER & IAN BYNOE, A HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION: THE OPTIONS FOR
BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND 68 (1998).
16. Spencer and Bynoe observe that in practice few commissions fill all of these
requirments. Id. at 68.
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protection of human rights. However, none has proved entirely
adequate for this task.
B. The Role of the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights
By the early 1970s the need for constitutional change in
Northern Ireland was clear. Critics argued that such human
rights abuses, notably in the spheres of religious discrimination
and the abuse of police powers, were at the root of the develop-
ing social unrest that gripped Northern Ireland during this pe-
riod.'7 Moreover, it was argued that there was a lack of sufficient
legal or institutional protection for human rights in Northern
Ireland, with the courts having shown themselves unwilling or
unable to intervene."8 As a means of rectifying this deficit, sev-
eral of Northern Ireland's political parties advocated the passing
of a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland, which would entrench
certain human rights guarantees in Northern Irish law.19 How-
ever, this proved too radical for the British government for the
day, which took the view that developing such a measure would
raise too many problems as to what rights should be enshrined
and what tribunal should be responsible for their interpretation
and application z.2  Instead, the government put forward propos-
als for a commission that would be "charged with the duty of
keeping in touch with the activities of all public agencies in the
field of human rights and of producing an annual report, in-
cluding recommendations as to any further statutory provision
17. For discussions of the role of human rights abuses in fueling political griev-
ances and protest, see MICHAEL FARRELL, NORTHERN IRELAND: THE ORANGE STATE
(1976), and Claire Palley, The Evolution, Disintegration and Possible Reconstruction of the
Northern Ireland Constitution, I ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 368 (1972). For government ap-
pointed commissions recognizing some of the problems in this area, see REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO DISTURBANCES IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1969, Cmnd. (N. Ir.)
532, and REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE POLICE IN NORTHERN IRELAND,
1969, Cmnd. (N. Ir.) 535.
18. For the failures of the Northern Irish courts when it came to tacking discrimi-
nation in particular, see KEVIN BOYLE ET AL., LAW AND STATE: THE CASE OF NORTHERN
IRELAND (1975), and Christopher McCrudden, Northern Ireland and the British Constitu-
tion, in THE CHANGING CONSTITUTION ch. 1, 338 (JeffreyJowell & Dawn Oliver eds., 3d
ed. 1994).
19. For a discussion of these proposals and of the general background to the crea-
tion of Standing Advisoy Commission on Human Rights ("SACHR"), see Paul Maguire,
The Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights 1973-80, 32 N. IR. L.Q. 31, 32-36
(1981).
20. Id. at 34.
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which it considers should be made."2 1
However, by the time the proposals made it into legislative
form they were considerably narrowed and Section 20 (1) of the
Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973 merely provided that
the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights
("SACHR") would have two purposes:
(a) Advising the Secretary of State on the Adequacy and ef-
fectiveness of the law for the time being in force in
preventing discrimination on the grounds of religious be-
lief or political opinion and in providing redress for per-
sons aggrieved by discrimination on either ground.
(b) Keeping the Secretary of State informed as to the extent
to which the persons, authorities and bodies mentioned
in section 19(1) [i.e., public authorities] have prevented
discrimination on either ground by persons or bodies
not prohibited from discriminating by that law.
22
Thus, while SACHR's name suggested it was a general
human rights commission, its statutory mandate limited it to
consideration of discrimination on the grounds of religion or
political opinion. Although, as we shall see below, the commis-
sion was able to widen the range of matters that it considered,
the narrowness of the formal mandate was a matter for constant
dispute with the government 23 and was one of the ways in which
the commission's legal basis inhibited its effectiveness. Another
was the lack of powers given to the commission even to achieve
its task of ensuring the law was adequate to prevent discrimina-
tion on the grounds of religion or political opinion. SACHR was
to be very much an advisory body to government. It had no pow-
ers to receive individual complaints, to initiate or assist litigants,
to conduct investigations into alleged human rights abuses, or to
examine draft legislation for compliance with human rights stan-
dards. In addition to being hindered as regards effectiveness,
SACHR would always face a struggle to establish its indepen-
dence from government as its (part-time) members were all ap-
pointed by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. 24 These
21. NORTHERN IRELAND CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS, 1973, Cmnd. 5259.
22. Northern Ireland Act, 1973 (Eng.) (author's addition in brackets).
23. Paul Maguire observes that the government rejected SACHR's arguments for
broadening its statutory remit but also advised it not to construe those terms of refer-
ence too narrowly. See Maguire, supra note 19, at 51.
24. SACHR's membership varied between eight and 16 over its lifetime. No crite-
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members were in turn heavily dependent on the commission's
full time staff, most of whom were directly seconded from gov-
ernment departments. 2 In addition to problems with regard to
effectiveness and independence, SACHR came to operate in a
very different political context than that for which it was
designed. When it was established in 1973, it was envisaged that
it would operate in the context of a new Northern Irish parlia-
ment and executive as provided for in the Sunningdale Agree-
ment. However, these institutions collapsed in early 1974 and
for the remainder of its history SACHR found itself dealing only
with a British government, which had assumed full executive and
legislative authority over Northern Ireland. Although' that Brit-
ish government's policy was far from consistent over the next
twenty-five years, a recurrent theme was the need for strong anti-
terrorist measures.26 As a result, while the Secretary of State du-
tifully laid SACHR's annual reports before Parliament, only one
of them was ever debated and many of SACHR's recommenda-
tions, especially in respect of emergency powers, fell on deaf
ears.
Hampered by its limited mandate and powers, struggling to
establish its independence before a skeptical public, and faced
by a largely unsympathetic administration, SACHR was always
likely to find its task a difficult one. It is to the credit of many of
its members that it did have an impact in a number of areas.
Perhaps the most significant was in the area that it was expressly
required to examine, the law relating to religious discrimination.
ria for appointment were indicated in the legislation and not until the 1990s were posi-
tions on the commission publicly advertised. As a result of the Anglo-Irish Agreement
1985, the Irish government was given the right to be consulted as to the membership of
SACHR, but no material on the outcome of such consultation has been made publicly
available.
25. SACHR had a small full time staff, usually four to five people. The head of this
staff, the commission's Secretary, was normally a civil servant on secondment from the
Northern Ireland Office. This was precisely the government department with which
SACHR was most often at odds. The author of one study observed that the commis-
sion's secretary "carries considerable influence in major policy decisions of the Com-
mission." See Maureen Maguire, Sitting Still?: A Review of the Standing Advisory Com-
mission on Human Rights 1973-95 (1995) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, Queen's Univer-
sity of Belfast) (on file with author).
26. For discussions of British policy in this period, see MICHAEL CUNNINGHAM, BRIT-
ISH GOVERNMENT POLICY IN NORTHERN IRELAND 1969-89 (1991), and Brendan O'Leary,
The Conservative Stewardship of Northern Ireland, 1979-97: Sound-bottomed Contradictions or
Slow Learning?, XLV POL. STUD. 663 (1997).
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SACHR's 1987 report on discrimination in employment 27 pro-
vided the framework for reforms of employment discrimination
law realized in the Fair Employment Act 1989,28 even if some
commentators felt the act fell short of the SACHR recommenda-
tions.2 9 The Fair Employment Act provided for a review of the
law on religious discrimination after five years and required the
government look to SACHR to provide the authoritative study.30
From the time of its first report, the commission also ventured
beyond the scope of its statutory mandate (sometimes at the ex-
press request of government) and produced a valuable series of
reports and studies on matters such as family law, gay rights, edu-
cation, and abortion in Northern Ireland. Some of these re-
sulted in the government introducing legislative changes."1
SACHR also sought to influence government policy in the
very politically sensitive area of anti-terrorist powers. Here it met
with a much lesser level of success. Recommendations for
greater rights for those detained under emergency legislation,
such as the video taping of interviews,32 immediate access to
legal representation, 3 and the need for judicial approval of ex-
tensions of detention in police custody beyond forty-eight
hours, 4 were all consistently rejected. Calls for the removal of
exclusion orders under the Prevention of Terrorism Act35 or the
reform of the law relating to the use of force by the police and
army36 fared no better. However, some were to be implemented
when political conditions changed,37 and SACHR's observations
27. STANDING ADVISORY COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL
DISCRIMINATION AND EQUALrIY OF OPPORTUNITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND-REPORT ON FAIR
EMPLOYMENT, 1987, Cm. 237.
28. Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act, 1989, ch. 32 (Eng.).
29. See, e.g., Christopher McCrudden, The Evolution of the Fair Employment (Northern
Ireland) Act 1989 in Parliament, in DISCRIMINATION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN NORTHERN IRE-
LAND 244 (Robert Cormack & Robert Osborne eds., 1991).
30. STANDING ADVISORY COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, EMPLOYMENT EQUALITY
LAw: BUILDING FOR THE FUTURE, 1997, Cm. 3684.
31. For example, SACHR's recommendations for the repeal of the 1954 Flags and
Emblems Act were reflected in the Public Order (Northern Ireland)) Order 1987, as
were its proposals to decriminalize adult male homosexuality in Northern Ireland in
the Homosexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 1978.
32. First recommended in its tenth report.
33. First recommended in the fourteenth report.
34. First appeared in the ninth report.
35. First set out in the tenth report.
36. Appeared regularly from the tenth report onwards.
37. For example, the media ban, which SACHR criticized from its introduction,
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on the compliance of emergency legislation with human rights
norms were given significant weight by the European Court of
Human Rights."8 Perhaps the nadir of its influence was reached
when the government introduced legislation curtailing the right
to silence39 without even consulting SACHR as to its content.
Above all, SACHR's consistent recommendations for the incor-
poration of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms40 ("EHCR" or "Con-
vention") into U.K. law, first made in 1977, 41 as a means of en-
suring greater protection of human rights in Northern Ireland,
was consistently rejected by government. Only when incorpora-
tion became part of the British political agenda, with the victory
of the Labour Party in the 1997 general elections, did the idea of
Northern Irish law acquiring fundamental rights guarantees be-
come a reality.
Overall, therefore, SACHR has had a somewhat limited in-
fluence on policymaking and implementation as regards the
protection of human rights in Northern Ireland. Much of this
can be traced to its limited powers (which it has continually
drawn attention to in its annual reports), limited resources, and
government intransigence. However, it is also fair to observe
that the commission has not always made the best use of the
powers and resources at its disposal. Given that the commission
found its reports meeting little response at the national level,
SACHR was somewhat slow to make use of international chan-
nels to highlight its cause. Several of the United Kingdom's
early reports to the U.N. Human Rights Committee and U.N.
Committee Against Torture went by without the U.N. bodies hav-
ing the benefit of SACHR's observations.42 The commission did
not do all that it might have done to publicize its work, even
was repealed after the first IRA cease-fire in 1994, and the government now plans to
provide for audio and video recording of interviews with terrorist suspects.
38. Notably in the Court's decision in Brogan v. United Kingdom, 145 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) (1988), which drew heavily on an amicus brief submitted by SACHR.
39. The Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order, 1988 (Eng.). For a discus-
sion, see John Jackson, Recent Developments in Criminal Evidence, 40 N. IR. L.Q. 105
(1989).
40. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
41. STANDING ADVISORY COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS BY LAW IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1977, Cmnd. 7009.
42. SACHR first submitted comments to the Human Rights Committee when it
undertook its Third Periodic Report of the United Kingdom in 1991. It only submitted
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within Northern Ireland. The 1977 report on a Bill of Rights
resulted from a major seminar, which, even if it did not produce
legislative change, was frequently quoted in debates around the
Bill of Rights issue in the United Kingdom for the next twenty
years. However, SACHR never again convened such a major
public event. By the early 1990s, it was issuing an average of only
three press releases per year and concentrating most of its media
work around the publication of its annual report.43 This was an
increasingly bulky document, which the media often found diffi-
cult to digest and summarize. On occasions, SACHR seemed
slow to react to new causes of concern with regard to the protec-
tion of human rights (for example, with respect to intimidation
of defense lawyers or racial discrimination in Northern Ireland)
and entered the fray only after the issue had been raised by
human rights NGOs.
Finally, although the commission extended its remit beyond
its original mandate, it did not. seek to extend it too far. Nothing
in the Northern Ireland Constitution Act prevented SACHR
from conducting investigations into issues of immediate concern
(such actions could be justified on the ground that they were
instrumental to offering advice to the Secretary of State), but the
commission shied away from embarking on such inquiries. In
the late 1980s, events such as the Stalker affair and allegations of
collusion between elements of the security forces and Loyalist
paramilitaries cried out for independent investigation, but the
then government offered only inquiries by senior police of-
ficers.44 Given that SACHR had no powers to compel the pro-
duction of witnesses or documents, any investigation by it into
such matters would likely have run into substantial obstacles.
However, an effort to try to do something to get to the bottom of
such matters might well have produced some response by the
authorities and would at least have advanced SACHR's claims to
independence.
In 1987, SACHR commissioned a report on its own powers
comments to the Committee Against Torture on the occasion of its examination of the
United Kingdom's Second Periodic Report in 1995.
43. See Maguire, supra note 25.
44. On the Stalker affair, which concerned allegations of a cover-up of unjustified
use of lethal force by the police, see JOHN STALKER, THE STALKER AFFAIR (1988). On
collusion allegations, see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, POLITICAL KILLINGS IN NORTHERN
IRELAND (1994).
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and effectiveness. The authors of the report agreed that it had
produced reports of high quality and maintained its impartial-
ity.4 5 However, they also felt that it was not a strong force to be
reckoned with in Northern Ireland, that it had a low public pro-
file, and that it had not adopted a campaigning attitude. The
lack of power to be involved with individual complaints was seen
as especially detrimental to its effectiveness. 46 Government re-
jected SACHR's requests for increased powers and the repetition
of SACHR's calls for a revised remit in its annual reports became
increasingly ritualistic.47
The commission never systematically evaluated its own effec-
tiveness, 4s but by the mid 1990s it was clear that whatever it had
achieved, concerns as to human rights violations remained
strong in Northern Ireland. Indeed, if anything, while the scale
of such violations may have decreased since the early 1970s, the
level of international interest had grown significantly. The Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, U.N. institutions, and interna-
tional human rights NGOs were all taking an increasingly en-
gaged and critical interest in human rights in Northern Ire-
land.4" Moreover, human rights NGOs within Northern Ireland
45. This was also the general view of most politicians in the debates on the new
Human Rights Commission (or "Commission") in 1998. Not all shared this view, how-
ever; Ulster Unionist spokesman John Taylor MP stated that in his view SACHR lacked
community balance. Many of its decisions were seen as partial and it was not respected
by the "greater number of people in Northern Ireland." House of Commons, Official
Report, vol. 317, July 27, 1998, col. 81.
46. See Anthony Bradley et al., Discrimination on Religious and Political Grounds: A
Report for the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights (1987), summarized in STAND-
ING ADVISORY COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL DISCRIMINATION
AND EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND: SECOND REPORT, 1990, Cm.
1107, 10.8.
47. In the nineteenth report, it highlighted the fact that its own remit was not
consistent with the Paris Principles.
48. See Maguire, supra note 25. Maguire notes that SACHR was unable to respond
fully to a request in 1993 from William Ross MP for a list of its recommendations to the
Secretary of State and "the success or otherwise of each particular recommendation
whether partial or full." Maguire also observes, "In fact the Commission could not com-
ply with Mr. Ross's straightforward request because it has never consciously followed the
fate of specific recommendations."
49. On the approach of the European Human Rights system, see Stephen Living-
stone, Reviewing Northern Ireland in Strasbourg 1969-94, 1 IR. H.R. Y.B. 15 (1995). For
U.N. examinations, see the Committee Against Torture reports of 1991 (CAT/C/
SR.133), 1995 (A/51/44), and 1998 (CAT/C/UK); the Human Rights Committee re-
port of 1995 (CCPR/C/79/Add.55); and the report of the Special Rapporteur on the
Independence of Judges and Lawyers in 1998 (E/CN.4/1998/39/Add.4). For increas-
ing interest of international NGOs, see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, POLITICAL KILLINGS IN
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and agencies such as SACHR have made increasing reference to
the importance of compliance with international standards in
the design of laws and institutions affecting human rights in
Northern Ireland. By these international standards, SACHR fell
well short of an adequate national institution for the protection
of human rights. Moreover, there were already examples within
Northern Ireland of more effective bodies working in the area.
C. Anti-Discrimination Commissions in Northern Ireland
Although SACHR was charged with the task of advising gov-
ernment on the law relating to discrimination on the grounds of
religion and political opinion, it was not the only or the most
important body acting in this area. In 1976, the Fair Employ-
ment (Northern Ireland) Act, which was passed to prohibit dis-
crimination on grounds of religion or political opinion in em-
ployment, created the Fair Employment Agency ("FEA"). The
FEA was initially given the task of receiving and resolving com-
plaints of discrimination in employment as well as advising em-
ployers of their obligations under the legislation and conducting
investigations into alleged patterns of discrimination. However,
its functions were substantially changed and the agency was
renamed the Fair Employment Commission ("FEC") with the
passing of the Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act 1989. A
key feature of these changes was that the FEC lost the power to
make adjudications on claims of discrimination and instead was
given the role of assisting individual applicants in bringing their
complaints before the newly created Fair Employment Tribu-
nals.5" This change was foreshadowed by a number of reports,
including SACHR's review of the law on religious discrimination,
which indicated that the FEA had found it difficult to combine
its adjudication role with its enforcement powers, to the detri-
ment of combating discrimination effectively.51 Too often, the
NORTHERN IRELAND (1994); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS IN NORTHERN IRE-
LAND (1991); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, To SERVE WITHOUT FAVOUR: POLICING, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1997); LAWYERS COMMITTEE ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LEGAL DEFENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND (1993); and
LAWYERS COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, AT THE CROSSROADS: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS (1996).
50. For a summary of the functions of the Fair Employment Commission, see Ste-
phen Livingstone, Religious Discrimination, in CIVIL LIBERTIES IN NORTHERN IRELAND 209-
11 (Brice Dickson ed., 3d ed. 1997).
51. See supra note 27; see also Christopher McCrudden, Law Enforcement by Regulatory
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FEA appeared anxious to resolve cases through pressure on both
sides to conciliate, rather than seeking to establish precedents,
whose impact would reach beyond the individual case. The 1989
legislation put the emphasis more on ensuring employers' com-
pliance with their legal obligations not to discriminate and cast
the FEC much more clearly in the role of an agency charged
with securing such compliance. In addition to its power to assist
individual applicants, the commission was also given enhanced
powers to conduct investigations into employers where a signifi-
cant imbalance of representation from one community was evi-
dent.5 2 Like SACHR, the FEC is a multi-member and part-time
Commission. Unlike SACHR, however, it has a full time Chief
Executive and a staff recruited by the commission itself. The
budget and staff of the FEC are also considerably larger than
that of SACHR.
The structure of the FEC is replicated in the Equal Oppor-
tunities Commission for Northern Ireland ("EOC-NI"), which
was established by the Sex Discrimination (Northern Ireland)
Order 1976.5" The EOC-NI also has power to assist applicants
alleging sex discrimination54 and to conduct investigations. Like
the FEC, it has a number of part-time commissioners who over-
see the work of a staff appointed directly by the commission.
Therefore, by the early 1990s there were clearly alternative
models available within Northern Ireland as to what a human
rights commission should look like." The power to assist litiga-
tion, to conduct investigations, and to appoint one's own staff
were central features of this alternative. It was also evident that
agencies with these powers were better known than those with-
out. In a 1989 study, conducted as part of SACHR's research
Agency: The Case of Employment Discrimination in Northern Ireland, 45 MOD. L. REv. 617
(1982).
52. Fair Employment Act, 1989, § 11 (N. Ir.).
53. Sex Discrimination (Northern Ireland) Order, 1976 (Eng.). Ironically,
SACHR once again had a hand in the creation of this. In 1976, the Secretary of State
for Northern Ireland had referred to it as the question of whether and how British sex
discrimination legislation should be applied to Northern Ireland. See Maguire, supra
note 19, at 48.
54. The Equal Opportunities Commission for Northern Ireland's ("EOC-NI") re-
mit is wider than the Fair Employment Commission ("FEC") and extends to goods,
facilities and services as well as employment.
55. The Commission for Racial Equality in Northern Ireland, established in 1997,
was given similar powers to the EOC-NI, but the Northern Ireland Disability Council,
which was set up in 1995, was given an advisory role more similar to SACHR.
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into public attitudes for its discrimination law review, over eighty
percent of respondents indicated awareness of the FEA and sixty-
six percent of the EOC as against just fifty percent for SACHR.5 a
II. TOWARDS A NEW COMMISSION: HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE BELFAST AGREEMENT
As the Northern Ireland peace process gathered pace, the
need for greater protection of human rights as part of any over-
all settlement became increasingly prominent.57 Whereas the
Anglo-Irish Agreement of 198558 contained a single article (Arti-
cle 5), which referred to the governments' role in promoting
respect for human rights and the need to consider whether a Bill
of Rights for Northern Ireland would be valuable, both the
Downing Street Declaration of 19935' and Framework Docu-
ments of 199560 indicated that respect for a number of rights
would have to be part of any agreement. On the political plane,
mechanisms to ensure greater respect for human rights within
Northern Ireland were seen as one thing that could be offered
to Nationalist politicians to encourage them to accept a political
settlement that allowed Northern Ireland to remain within the
United Kingdom. Moreover, it was a concession that there was
evidence of Unionists' willingness, for all Northern Ireland's
political parties had indicated support for a Bill of Rights by the
early 1990s.61
With the election of a Labour government, which pledged
to incorporate the European Convention on Human Rights into
British law, another obstacle was removed at the 1997 U.K. gen-
56. See DAVID SMITH, EQUALITY AND INEQUALITY IN NORTHERN IRELAND: PART 3-
PERCEPTIONS AND VIEWS 101 (1987).
57. For detailed discussion of the development of human rights themes in docu-
ments produced by the British and Irish governments over this period, see Colin Harvey
& Stephen Livingstone, Human Rights and the Peace Process in Northern Ireland, 3 EUR.
H.R. L.R. - (forthcoming 1999). For a discussion of the development of the peace
process, see EAMONN MALLIE & DAVID MCKITTRICK, THE FIGHT FOR PEACE: THE SECRET
STORY BEHIND THE IRISH PEACE PROCESS (1996).
58. Anglo-Irish Agreement Between the Government of Ireland and the Govern-
ment of the United Kingdom, Nov. 15, 1985, Cmnd. 9657, reprinted in TOM HADDEN &
KEVIN BOYLE, THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREEMENT 15-48 (1987) [hereinafter Anglo-Irish Agree-
ment].
59. Cmnd. 2442.
60. A New Framework for Agreement, Dec. 1994, 34 I.L.M. 946 (1995).
61. See COMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, A BILL, OF RIGHTS FOR
NORTHERN IRELAND (1993).
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eral election. To many observers, British reluctance to accede to
widespread support for a Bill of Rights in Northern Ireland al-
ways had more to do with an antipathy to the entrenching of
human rights in British law generally than with the question of
whether it was desirable in Northern Ireland. However,
although the Framework Documents indicated the need to en-
trench certain rights in any new constitutional arrangements for
Northern Ireland and to strengthen measures to combat dis-
crimination, they said little on the issue of new institutional ar-
rangements to enforce these rights. Human rights NGOs, such
as the Committee on the Administration of Justice, argued
strongly that a new Human Rights Commission was needed to
ensure that any rights did not remain paper rights.6 2 Yet when
the new multi-party talks opened in September 1997, it was far
from clear that this position was accepted by those involved in
them.
This remained the position for most of those talks as it
seemed that while the need for greater human rights provisions
was accepted as an inevitable part of any settlement, little discus-
sion on the details occurred until the final two weeks of negotia-
tions. The outcome of these was a specific section of the Agree-
ment on "Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity-
Human Rights." The agreement Signatories committed to the
Agreement to "the mutual respect, the civil rights and the reli-
gious liberties of everyone in the community." It went on to out-
line eight-rights, which the parties affirmed in particular. These
rights included (1) the right of free political thought; (2) the
right to freedom and expression of religion; (3) the right to pur-
sue democratically national and political aspirations; (4) the
right to seek constitutional change by peaceful and legitimate
means; (5) the right to choose one's place of residence freely;
(6) the right to equal opportunity in all social and economic
activity, regardless of class, creed, disability, gender, or ethnicity;
(7) the right to freedom from sectarian harassment; and (8) the
right of women to full and equal political participation.63
No commitment is given to enshrine these rights in any
62. See COMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, MAKING A BILL OF RIGHTS
STICK: THE OPTIONS FOR NORTHERN IRELAND (1997).
63. Belfast Agreement, supra note 2, Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportu-
nity, Human Rights 9 1.
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legal form, but the Agreement goes on to outline commitments
by the British Government to incorporate the ECHR fully into
Northern Irish law (including the power for courts to overrule
Assembly legislation for inconsistency with its provisions), to cre-
ate a statutory obligation on public authorities in Northern Ire-
land to carry out their functions with due regard to promote
equality of opportunity in respect of a number of criteria,6 4 and
to consider recommendations for what might be included in a
specific Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland beyond the guaran-
tees of the ECHR.65 The Irish Government also committed itself
to strengthening its protection of human rights and taking steps
to ensure "at least an equivalent level of protection of human
rights as will pertain in Northern Ireland."66 Specifically, it
agrees to take a number of measures including (1) ratifying the
Council of Europe Framework Convention on National Minori-
ties, (2) implementing enhanced employment equality legisla-
tion, and (3) introducing equal status legislation.
However, for the purposes of this Essay, perhaps the most
significant aspects of this section of the Agreement was the com-
mitment to create new institutions for the protection of human
rights in Northern Ireland. One was the Equality Commission, to
replace the existing commissions on fair employment, sex dis-
crimination, race discrimination, and disability. The second was
a new Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission. The Agree-
ment indicated that this new commission would replace SACHR
and that its membership would reflect "community balance."
The new commission would have an "extended and enhanced"
role beyond that of SACHR, which would include (1) keeping
under review the adequacy and effectiveness of laws and prac-
tices; (2) making recommendations to Government as necessary;
(3) providing information and promoting awareness of human
rights; (4) considering draft legislation referred to them by the
new Assembly; and (5) in "appropriate cases," bringing court
64. Those listed are religion, political opinion, gender, race, disability, age, marital
status, dependants, and sexual orientation. This commitment has now been given legis-
lative force in Section 75 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998.
65. Belfast Agreement, supra note 2, Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportu-
nity, Human Rights, United Kingdom Legislation 2-4.
66. Id., Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity, Human Rights, Compara-
ble Steps by the Irish Government 9.
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proceedings or providing assistance to individuals doing so.67
The commission was also to be charged with the task of advising
the government on any Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland. In
addition to this Commission, the Irish government pledged that
it would create a human rights commission "with a mandate and
remit equivalent to that in Northern Ireland," and Section 10 of
the Agreement envisaged a creation of a joint committee of the
representatives of these two human rights commissions. The
one specific task that the Agreement outlined for this joint com-
mittee was to consider "the possibility of establishing a charter,
open to signature by all democratic political parties, reflecting
and endorsing agreed measures for the protection of the funda-
mental rights of everyone living in the island of Ireland."
The inclusion of specific human rights commitments in the
Agreement, which has since been approved by referendums
both in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, indicates
that it goes beyond a set of arrangements for the institutions of
government to embrace the idea of certain fundamental values
lying at the heart of any future arrangements for the govern-
ment of Northern Ireland."8 This in turn, as will be discussed in
more detail later, strengthens the position of the new human
rights and equality commissions. They may justly claim that they
are not simply further "quangos," which may be swept away when
fully representative arrangements for government are restored
to Northern Ireland," but instead are integral parts of the new
arrangements for the governance of Northern Ireland. Within
67. Id., Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity, Human Rights, New Insti-
tutions in Northern Ireland 1 5.
68. This is reinforced by Paragraph 2 of the "Declaration of Support" at the start of
the Agreement, where all parties pledge to "firmly dedicate ourselves to the achieve-
ment of reconciliation, tolerance and mutual trust and to the protection and vindica-
tion of the human rights of all." Id., Declaration for Support 1 2. Also, Paragraph 1 (v)
of the "Constitutional Issues" section whereby the parties endorse the commitments of
the British and Irish governments to the effect that whatever choice is freely expressed
by a majority of the people of Northern Ireland, "the power of sovereign government
with jurisdiction there shall be exercised with rigorous impartiality on the behalf of all
the people in the diversity of their identities and traditions and shall be founded on the
principles of full respect for, and equality of, civil, political, social and cultural rights, of
freedom from discrimination for all citizens, and of parity of esteem and of just and
equal treatment for the identity, ethos and aspirations of both communities." Id., Con-
stitutional Issues I 1 (v).
69. For discussion of the role of quangos in Northern Ireland, see JOHN MORISON
& STEPHEN LIVINGSTONE, RESHAPING PUBLIC POWER: NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE BRIT-
ISH CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS 161-68 (1995).
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those arrangements they have the specific role of acting as the
guardians of the human rights and equality provisions that are
central to it. However, whether they are able to play this role
effectively depend on whether they would be given the legal nec-
essary authority.
III. MAKING RIGHTS EFFECTIVE: THE HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMISSION AND THE NORTHERN IRELAND
ACT 1998
A. The Legislative Process
Not all human rights campaigners were satisfied by the pro-
visions for the Human Rights Commission set out in the Belfast
Agreement. 70 Critical studies noted that the Agreement left it
unclear as to how independent the new Commission would be
(especially as to its funding and power to appoint its own staff)
and whether it would only be able to review legislation that the
Assembly chose to send it. Few were concerned with the absence
of power to receive and adjudicate complaints (the problems of
the Fair Employment Agency having perhaps paid to this model
in Northern Ireland), but many noted the lack of any power to
conduct investigations. The absence of this function was espe-
cially regrettable since, as has been noted earlier, it was precisely
the absence of independent investigation into serious and dis-
puted human rights concerns that had led to much disillusion-
ment with the state of human rights protection in the 1980s and
1990s.
These concerns were not assuaged by either the draft legis-
lation, which went before the U.K. Parliament in July of 1998 or
the process leading up to it. While the making of the Agree-
ment, by all accounts, was preceded by lengthy and open consul-
tation with many parties, the draft legislation was a much more
rushed affair. Many of the politicians involved in the Agreement
negotiations complained that they saw drafts of the legislation
only shortly before it was submitted to Parliament and had little
opportunity to comment on it. With respect to the Human
70. See, e.g., BRICE DICKSON, CREATING AN EFFECTIVE HUMAN RIGiHITS COMMISSION
FOR NORTHERN IRELAND: A PAPER COMMISSIONED BY THE STANDING ADVISORY COMMIS-
SION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1998); Christopher McCrudden, The Northern Ireland
Human Rights Commission: Some Comments (1998) (unpublished paper prepared
for the Committee on the Administration of Justice) (on file with author).
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Rights Commission, the bill not only failed to address concerns,
as to the lack of investigation powers, but also appeared to re-
treat from the commitments in the Agreement by omitting to
provide for a power for the Commission to bring court proceed-
ings of its own motion. Although this retreat from the position
set out in the Agreement was not as severe as in the case of the
equality provisions (where the Agreement's commitment to the
provision of impact statements by public authorities disappeared
in the original version of the bill),71 it was sufficient to trigger
extensive lobbying efforts to amend the legislative proposals.
Early in the debate on the bill, the British Government accepted
the need for further consultation on its human rights provi-
sions,72 and subsequently brought forward a significant number
of amendments of its own. Such actions have clearly improved
the provisions for the Human Rights Commission from those set
out in the original bill. Whether they are enough to satisfy all
the concerns of the Government's critics remains to be seen.
B. Composition, Staffing and Funding of the Commission
The new Commission is to be established under the author-
ity of Section 68 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998." 3 Section
68(2) of this act indicates that the Commission is to consist of "a
Chief Commissioner and other Commissioners appointed by the
Secretary of State." 4 Schedule 7 of the act indicates that Chief
Commissioners are appointed to five-year terms and other Com-
missioners for three years.75 The British Government subse-
quently indicated that the Chief Commissioner would be a full-
time post and that up to a further nine Commissioners would be
appointed on a part-time basis.7 6
In a break with the tradition that had prevailed under
SACHR (whose appointments procedure always remained some-
71. For a summary of the concerns as to the Human Rights and Equality provisions
of the bill, see Kevin McNamara, Inattention to Detail on Amendments on Detail Could Be
Costly, IFUSH TIMES, Oct. 29, 1998.
72. See House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 315, July 20, 1998; col. 879 (Mr.
Murphy).
73. Northern Ireland Act, 1998, ch. 47, § 68 (Eng.).
74. Id. § 68(2).
75. Id. sched. 7(2).
76. The idea that at least some Commissioners should be full-time was advocated
by Brice Dickson, supra note 70. Professor Dickson has since been appointed to be the
first Chief Commissioner, Northern Ireland Office Press Release, Jan. 18, 1999.
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thing of a mystery), but in line with current government criteria
for public appointments,77 all of these posts were advertised and
applications were invited from the general public. The adver-
tisements indicated that knowledge of human rights was a "desir-
able but not essential" criterion for appointment and also that
applicants should have a "balanced" approach to human
rights.7" Section 68(3) of the act also indicates that in making
appointments the Secretary of State "shall as far as practicable
secure that the Commissioners, as a group, are representative of
the community in Northern Ireland."79 In legislative debates,
the Minister of State indicated that the Government regarded
"community" here as referring essentially to Nationalists and
Unionists,8" even though a broader definition of community is
utilized for the Civic Forum" and it might be argued that ethnic
minorities in Northern Ireland would have a strong interest in
representation on a Human Rights Commission. Whether the
selection process will be able to produce a group of Commission-
ers who satisfy both Nolan criteria and "community representa-
tiveness" tests remains to be seen. Certainly the recent experi-
ence of the Parades Commission suggests that basing an agency's
legitimacy largely on its claim to community balance is vulnera-
ble to shifts in composition and community perception. The
withdrawal of the main Protestant representative on this Com-
mission was swiftly followed by Unionist politicians indicating
that they no longer regarded it as an authoritative body.
Whereas the staffing arrangements for SACHR seemed to
involve a clear breach of the Paris Principles, the new Commis-
sion will be empowered to appoint its own staff, "subject to the
approval of the Secretary of State as to numbers and remunera-
tion."'82 However, whether it will have adequate resources to ap-
point sufficient staff remains uncertain. The legislation provides
77. See FIRST REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS IN PUBLIC LIFE, 1995, Cm.
2850-I.
78. Information on the appointment criteria can be found on the Northern Ire-
land Office website. See http://www.nio.gov.uk.
79. Northern Ireland Act, 1998, ch. 47, § 68(3) (Eng.).
80. Paul Murphy MP stated: "I think that all the world knows what traditions and
communities we are considering: the broad Unionist community and the broad nation-
alist community." House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 317, July 27, 1998, col. 60.
81. Belfast Agreement, supra note 2, Strand One, Democratic Institutions in
Northern Ireland, Relations with other institutions 34.
82. Northern Ireland Act, 1998, sched. 7(4)(1).
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for the Commission to be funded by grants from the Secretary of
State out of the money provided by Parliament. This does not
seem to envisage the Commission directly seeking funds from
Parliament, and it will remain dependent on the decisions of the
Secretary of State as to the resources that it will receive each
year. The British Government indicated in the debates on the
bill that it expected the Commission's budget to be £750,00 in its
first year.8" This is just over £500,000 more than the budget of
SACHR in its last year although the new Commission has a sub-
stantially enhanced role and over £120,000 of that increase is
likely to be consumed by Commissioners' salaries. The Commis-
sion's projected budget is about half that of the current Equal
Opportunities Commission for Northern Ireland and is likely to
be under severe stress if it engages in much litigation or investi-
gative activity. Any sort of adequate consultative exercise on a
Bill of Rights is likely to require separate funding, and the early
years of the Commission may well see it in regular dispute with
government as to the adequacy of financial commitment given
to it.8
4
C. Functions and Powers of the Commission
Sections 69 and 70 of the Northern Ireland Act set out the
Commission's functions.8 5 The Commission retains the general
advice function that SACHR developed over the years. This is
now expressed as the duty to advise both the Secretary of State
and the Executive Committee of the Assembly "of legislative and
other measures which ought to be taken to protect human
rights,"86 either on request or as it thinks appropriate. In addi-
tion, the Commission gains a range of functions that were not
available to SACHR. These functions are discussed below:
83. This was confirmed by the Minister of State, Paul Murphy MP on the parlia-
mentary debates on the Act, House of Commons, Official Report, vol. 317, July 27,
1998, col. 66.
84. The South African Commission was allocated a budget of R6.8m (US$1.5 mil-
lion) in its first year. At the end of this it requested an increase to R32m (US$7 mil-
lion). See David McQuoid-Mason, The Role of Human Rights Institutions in South Af-
rica, unpublished paper submitted to the International Conference on the Establish-
ment of the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission and the Institution of the
Ombudsman, Addis Ababa (May 18-22, 1998).
85. Northern Ireland Act, 1998, ch. 47, §§ 69-70 (Eng.).
86. Id. § 69(3).
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1. Power to Advise the Assembly Whether a Bill Is Compatible
with Human Rights
s7
Perhaps the first thing to note in respect to this' power is
that the Commission is required to advise on compatibility with
"human rights" and not simply the Convention rights that have
now become part of U.K. law with the passing of the Human
Rights Act. In parliamentary debates, the responsible minister
accepted that this would allow the Commission to look at a
broad range of international human rights provisions, including
things like the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 8 Convention on the Rights of the Child,89 and various
anti-discrimination Conventions.9" Many of these go much fur-
ther than the European Convention on Human Rights, and the
Commission might even include in its definition of human
rights things such as U.N. codes of conduct. Section 14 of the
Northern Ireland Act provides that Standing Orders of the As-
sembly will make provision for the Assembly's Presiding Officer
to send all bills to the Commission as soon as reasonably practi-
cable after they have been introduced and for the Assembly to
request the Commission's view on whether a bill is compatible
with human rights. Only if such a request is made is the Com-
mission under an obligation to offer such advice. However, the
Commission may also tender advice even if this has not been
requested, where it thinks that this is appropriate. This is a sen-
sible provision that will give the Commission a degree of discre-
tion as to which proposed legislative measures it wishes to com-
ment on. It is hoped though that Ministers of the Assembly will
seek the Commission's advice on draft legislation before it has
been introduced in bill form, lest changes become more difficult
subsequently.
The Commission, of course, only has the power to give ad-
87. Id. § 69(4).
88. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967).
89. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th
Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 167, U.N Doc. A/44/736 (1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1448.
90. The legislation does not itself define human rights. Lord Williams of Mostyn
indicated at committee stage in the House of Lords that it would be for the Commission
itself to define this, House of Lords, Official Report, vol. 593, Oct. 21, 1998, col. 1529.
Section 69(11) (b) of the Northern Ireland Act, which defines "human rights" as "in-
cluding the Convention rights," would also appear to endorse giving an interpretation
to the term that goes beyond the scope of the ECHR.
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vice. There is no requirement on Ministers to accept it, and the
Commission has no power to certify whether or not legislation
may be enacted. However, there are both a range of measures
that suggest that the Commission's advice should be taken seri-
ously and a range of avenues for the Commission to pursue if it
is not. To start, Section 6(2) (c) of the Northern Ireland Act pro-
vides that the Assembly does not have competence to pass legis-
lation that is inconsistent with Convention rights. Ministers in-
troducing legislation are required to make a statement that it is
consistent with the Assembly's legislative competence.9 It would
be difficult to do this in good faith where the Commission has
indicated a belief to the contrary. Even if a Minister does make
such a statement, the Presiding Officer of the Assembly has the
power not to allow a bill to go forward where he or she believes
that it is outside the legislative competence, 92 and the Attorney
General for Northern Ireland may refer to the Privy Council any
bill on the same basis.93 Failure of either of these things happen-
ing will put the Commission in a position to assist applicants rais-
ing the issue of compatibility with the Convention in subsequent
proceedings.
In addition to ensuring that Assembly legislation is consis-
tent with Convention rights, Section 14(5) (a) provides that the
Secretary of State may refuse to submit for the Royal Assent any
bill that contains a provision that is "incompatible with any inter-
national obligations. '9 4 This provides an opportunity for the
Commission to put pressure on the Assembly to ensure that any
legislation is compatible with the United Kingdom's other inter-
national human rights obligations, for example, with the Inter-
national Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights9 5 or
the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Therefore, there are a range of measures that should ensure
that the Commission's voice will be heard when it comes to de-
91. Northern Ireland Act, 1998, § 9(1). It is worth noting that although the
Human Rights Act 1998 is not scheduled to be brought into force throughout the
United Kingdom until early 2000, Schedule 14 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 pro-
vides that with respect to the legislative competence of the Assembly it will be treated as
being in force.
92. Id. § 10(1).
93. Id. § 11(1).
94. Id. § 14(5)(a).
95. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 165, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
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ciding whether the Assembly passes legislation that is consistent
with human rights standards. However, it is worth remembering
that these provisions only apply to legislation of the Assembly.
Many of the issues on which, from a human rights perspective,
controversial legislation might be passed come within the pur-
view of reserved or excepted matters. This includes the whole of
policing and criminal justice as well as immigration law and the
maintenance of public order.9 6 On these issues the Commis-
sion's formal position is identical to that of SACHR. It can only
hope that the British government proves more willing to consult
and listen to it than it did with respect to its predecessor.
2. Power to Provide Assistance to Individuals in Proceedings
Raising Human Rights Issues and to Bring such
Proceedings Itself
Section 69(5) (b) of the Northern Ireland Act restored the
power promised in the Agreement that the Commission would
have the power to initiate proceedings in its own right.97 How-
ever, the value of this is reduced by Section 71(1), which indi-
cates that nothing in Section 69(5) (b) will allow anyone to initi-
ate proceedings alleging (or relying upon) a breach of Conven-
tion rights, unless they can show themselves to be a "victim" for
the purposes of the ECHR.9 Given that Convention rights will
be the main source of legally enforceable human rights in
Northern Irish law, it is difficult to see what this leaves the Com-
mission to base any actions on. The anti-discrimination provi-
sions of Northern Irish statute law might be one candidate, but
the Commission may feel that such actions are best left to the
Equality Commission. Others could be common law notions of
"fundamental rights"99 or making use of the United Kingdom's
other international human rights obligations. However, the first
are likely to be subsumed under Convention rights while it is
96. However, as reserved matters, there remains the possibility in the future that
policing, criminal justice, and public order may come within the competence of the
Assembly.
97. Northern Ireland Act, 1998, ch. 47, § 69(5)(b) (Eng.).
98. Id. § 71(1). This is also the test for standing used in the Human Rights Act
1998. The European Court of Human Rights has defined "victim" in a way that largely
excludes representative actions. See DAVID HARRIs ET AL., THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 630-38 (1995).
99. For a discussion of these, see John Laws, Is the Hugh Court the Guardian of Funda-
mental Rights?, 1993 PUB. L. 59.
1489
1490 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 22:1465
doubtful that the second will give rise to any enforceable legal
obligations.10° To require the Commission to enter such actions
without invoking Convention rights is to ask it to go into court
with one hand tied behind its back.
The Commission's litigation activity is therefore more likely
to focus on assisting individual applicants raising Convention is-
sues.""' Here, its main problem is likely to be deciding on a
strategy for the offering of assistance. When the Human Rights
Act comes into force, it opens up a potentially vast range of legal
issues to human rights concerns. Many criminal defendants, al-
most anyone suing the police or prison service, and not a few
litigants in property-related matters might claim that their case
has a human rights aspect. If the Commission extends its defini-
tion of human rights beyond the Convention rights, then even
more cases may come within its purview. Taking all these cases
would clearly swamp the Commission and swiftly bring on budg-
etary crisis. To avoid this, the Human Rights Commission would
do well to follow the lead of the FEC and EOC in developing a
strategy around priority areas, backed up by a willingness to refer
other cases to private lawyers. To make this strategy successful,
the Commission will need to be assured that legal practitioners
throughout Northern Ireland are conversant with the new legal
provisions of the Human Rights Act, something that comes
within its education mandate.
In coming to decisions about litigation strategy, the legisla-
tion offers some assistance. Section 70(2) provides that assist-
ance may be granted (a) where the case raises an issue of princi-
ple, (b) where it would be unreasonable to expect the person in
question to deal with the matter without assistance, e.g., by rea-
son of the complexity of the matter, or (c) where there are other
special circumstances that make assistance appropriate. 10 2 This
still leaves a very broad area of discretion for the Commission to
set priorities on. It may well decide as a matter of policy not to
assist criminal defendants or appellants, save in exceptional
100. For a discussion of the status of human rights treaties in British law, a discus-
sion that retains its relevance for treaties other than the ECHR, see MURRAY HUNT,
USING HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN ENGLISH COURTS (1997).
101. It can also seek to persuade the Attorney General for Northern Ireland, who
does have standing without needing to show victim status, to initiate Convention-based
actions.
102. Id. § 70(2).
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cases (as these will normally be legally aided), and to allow the
Equality Commission to deal with all those raising discrimination
issues. Pending reforms to legal aid in Northern Ireland could
put more pressure on the Commission to accept cases that no
private lawyer is willing to take.1 °3
The legislation makes no reference to the Commission be-
ing able to intervene as amicus curiae in any proceedings before
the courts. However, this is not ruled out and it would appear to
be a valuable way for the Commission to play a role in cases,
especially those which reach the Court of Appeal or Privy Coun-
cil, without taking on the responsibility of litigating the case it-
self. Courts in the United Kingdom have shown themselves in-
creasingly willing to accept amicus briefs at the appellate stage
10 4
and it is hoped that judicial encouragement will be shown to the
Commission in this regard.
3. The Power to Conduct Investigations
In the end, Section 69(8) of the Northern Ireland Act pro-
vided that "for the purpose of exercising its functions under this
section the Commission may conduct such investigations as it
considers necessary or expedient." °5 Since Section 69(1) in-
cludes in the Commission's functions the general obligation to
keep under review the adequacy of law and practice affecting
human rights in Northern Ireland, it appears that the Commis-
sion has a broad remit to conduct investigations."6 Although
the inclusion of this power went some way to satisfying critics
who noted its absence from the original bill, the Government
still stopped short of giving it powers to acquire documents or
interview witnesses. Government spokesmen indicated that
there was insufficient consensus among the political parties for
this to be included.10 7 Although the same spokesmen pledged
that the British government would cooperate fully with the Com-
103. Section 70(4) of the Northern Ireland Act allows the Commission to recover
expenses "in certain circumstances." Id. § 70(4). This may enable it to recover costs
from successful litigants.
104. See, for example, the recent Pinochet case, R v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendi-
ary Magistrate ex p Pinochet Ugarte (Amnesty International Intervening) 4 ALL. E.R. 897
(1998).
105. Northern Ireland Act, 1998, ch. 47, § 69(8) (Eng.).
106. Id. § 69(1).
107. House of Lords, Official Report, vol. 593, Oct. 21, 1998, col. 1539 (Lord Mos-
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mission, they added that such cooperation would be subject to
the need to protect national security, public safety, and public
order."°8 Moreover, this pledge cannot bind agencies such as
the police, who are formally independent of government direc-
tion.
The power to conduct investigations has already been high-
lighted as one that is especially apposite for a human rights com-
mission in Northern Ireland. However, it is difficult to believe
that investigations into issues such as Stalker, collusion, or the
use of plastic bullets would have gone very far without the power
to subpoena witnesses or obtain documents. In setting up the
Saville Inquiry into Bloody Sunday, the Government appears to
have recognized that getting to the truth of controversial and
disputed matters requires the powers of a judicial inquiry.'09
Since the structure of the Act recognizes the Commission as an
institution with the function of scrutinizing the Assembly (since
its powers are an excepted matter not capable of change by the
Assembly), it is arguable that the emphasis should have been
more on making sure that it has effective powers than that As-
sembly parties support them. In their current formulation, it is
not clear that the Commission's powers conform to the Paris
Principles standards." 0
As with the power to assist litigation, the Commission will
need to act strategically with regard to its investigation powers.
In this area, it is also likely to be faced with a myriad of claims to
investigate incidents or alleged patterns of abuse. Part of that
strategy may involve referring requests to other institutions, such
as the Equality Commission, Police Ombudsman, or Parades
Commission, provided that it feels that these institutions have
the requisite authority and commitment. However, it may be
wise for the Commission to test at an early stage the public com-
mitments of cooperation that it is likely to receive initially from a
range of public agencies. Undertaking a significant investigation
early in its life may help the Commission identify the scope of its
108. Id. at 1543.
109. Both the FEC and EOC-NI also have considerably stronger powers of investi-
gation.
110. These provide that the National Institution "shall hear any person and obtain
any information and any documents necessary for assessing situations falling within its
competence."
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power and the actual depth of the state's commitment to its ef-
fectiveness.
4. The Power to Promote Understanding and Awareness of
Human Rights in Northern Ireland
This was power that SACHR regarded itself as having but
did little to act upon. Section 69 (6) of the Northern Ireland Act
now places the Commission under an explicit obligation to pur-
sue this. The introduction of the Human Rights Act may pro-
vide the focus for the Commission to conduct a public education
campaign at several levels. It may want to ensure that the judici-
ary, lawyers, public authorities, the police, and prison services all
have an adequate understanding of the implications of the
Human Rights Act for them either through delivering training
to them itself or certifying the adequacy of their own in-house
training. The Commission may also seek to take education in
human rights to a much broader range of people, perhaps
through developing human rights training in schools or via a
media campaign.
5. The Power to Advise the Secretary of State on Additional
Rights to Be Enshrined in a Northern Ireland
Bill of Rights
Section 69(7) of the Northern Ireland Act places the Secre-
tary of State under an obligation to request information from
the Commission on what additional rights might be included in
a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights. In paragraph 4 of the Belfast
Agreement, to which the act explicitly refers, it is suggested that
these additional rights should reflect "the principles of mutual
respect for the identity and ethos of both communities and par-
ity of esteem." It goes on to refer explicitly to two matters that
the Commission should consider:
the formulation of a general obligation on government and
public bodies to respect fully, on the basis of equality of
treatment, the identity and ethos of both communities in
Northern Ireland; and
a clear formulation of the rights not to be discriminated
against and to equality of opportunity in both the public
and private sectors.
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The second of these topics invites consideration of exten-
sion of Section 76 of the Northern Ireland Act, which both pro-
hibits discrimination by public authorities on the grounds of reli-
gious belief or political opinion, inlcuding forms of "indirect"
discrimination," 1 and prohibits non-employment related acts of
discrimination in the private sector. This reflects the weakness
of Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights,
which is too narrow to serve as an adequate anti-discrimination
provision in Northern Ireland! 12 It may also provide for consid-
eration as to whether other categories such as race, disability,
sex, and sexual orientation might be included in this guarantee,
although the Agreement seems to direct consideration only to
"two communities" issues. The first of the topics invites more
detailed consideration of how to give a legal expression to "par-
ity of esteem" questions first highlighted in SACHR's 1990 study
on equality of opportunity."' Issues relating to language, educa-
tion, and expressions of cultural identity may well feature promi-
nently in such deliberations.
Providing advice on any such additional rights poses both
procedural and substantive challenges for the Commission. The
procedural challenge is how to go about providing this advice.
There are good arguments for engaging in the sort of large-scale
consultation exercise that the South African Constitutional Con-
vention engaged in when seeking to draft a Bill of Rights"1 4 and
that the Policing Commission has recently undertaken in North-
ern Ireland. Such an exercise would assist the Commission's
public education efforts and might strengthen the legitimacy of
any recommendations. The substantive challenge is what rights
the Commission will ultimately recommend the Secretary of
State to include. It could decide to range wider than the areas
suggested by paragraph 4 of the Agreement and seek inclusion
of a much broader range of international human rights obliga-
111. It was generally assumed that Section 19 of the Northern Ireland Constitution
Act 1973, the predecessor of Section 76, only applied to direct or intentional discrimi-
nation. See supra note 46, 4.18.
112. Article 14 of the ECHR is not a general anti-discrimination provision. It only
prohibits unequal treatment with respect to other rights guaranteed under the Conven-
tion. For a critique, see Stephen Livingstone, Article 14 and the Prevention of Discrimina-
tion in the European Convention on Human Rights, 1 EUR. H.R. L. REv. 25 (1997).
113. See supra note 46, 8.34.
114. See NAZREEN BAWA, HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOUTH AFRICA: LESSONS FOR BUILDING
INSTITUTIONS 19-31 (1998).
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tions (perhaps including economic, social, and cultural rights),
especially if a consultation exercise reveals support for this.
Even if it keeps to the areas suggested in the Agreement, it faces
a difficult task in reconciling the sort of communal rights that
may be required to give effect to principles of parity of esteem,
with the individual rights contained in the Human Rights Act.
The whole issue of contentious marches, which has given rise to
especially bitter conflict in recent years, is one area where such
difficulties are likely to be manifest.1 5
6. Doing All that It Can Do to Establish a Joint North-South
Human Rights Committee1 1 6
At the time of writing, the Irish Government has yet to an-
nounce their proposals for legislation to create a Human Rights
Commission, though this is expected in the near future. The
Agreement suggests that this joint committee has the very gen-
eral task of being "a forum for consideration of human rights
issues in the island of Ireland" and the specific obligation of con-
sidering the establishment of a charter of rights to be signed by
all Irish political parties. The latter may be a useful symbolic
exercise, but one suspects it may be drafted at such a high level
of generality that it is unlikely to be more than this.
The joint committee might take on the role of scrutinizing
the extent to which decisions of the North-South ministerial
bodies provided for in Strand Two of the Agreement raise
human rights issues. Actions in the field of health, education,
the environment, and language 1 7 may all raise human rights
questions. Matters relating to family law and land ownership are
other areas where the joint committee may want to make propos-
als to harmonize human rights protections throughout the is-
land. The committee may also want to explore the extent to
which developments at a European level pose new issues for the
protection of human rights on both sides of the Irish border."'
115. For a discussion of different ways ahead in giving effect to these principles,
see KEVIN BOYLE & TOM HADDEN, NORTHERN IRELAND: THE CHOICE 159-207 (1994).
116. Northern Ireland Act, 1998, § 69(10).
117. All such fields have been identified in the recent agreement between the First
Minister and Deputy First Minister on proposed cross-border bodies. Deaglan de
Breadun, Timetable for Setting Up North's Institutions Agreed, IRISH TIMES, Jan. 16, 1999.
118. For a discussion of some of these issues, see Anthony Whelan, Fundamental
Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law in the Third Pillar, in JUSTICE CO-OPERATION IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION 205 (Gavin Barrett ed., 1997).
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Joint programs on human rights education and training are an-
other matter that could emerge from this joint committee.
Overall, therefore, the Northern Ireland Act attributes a
wide range of functions to the new Human Rights Commission.
Although the act met many concerns of critics of the original
bill, it did not go all the way. In an effort to reassure these crit-
ics, the British Government introduced Section 69(2), which
provides for the Commission to review its functions, provisions,
and effectiveness within two years and to make recommenda-
tions to the Secretary of State. What recommendations it makes
will depend heavily on how it finds its powers working out over
the next two years.
IV. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
The Human Rights Commission has the opportunity to
make a considerable contribution to the protection of human
rights in Northern Ireland, but it is wise not to overestimate its
potential. It can be argued that the most significant violations of
human rights in Northern Ireland over the past thirty years have
stemmed from the abuse of emergency powers, misconduct by
the police and army, and patterns of religious discrimination.
The capacity of the Commission to effect change in each of
these areas is limited. Dealing with religious discrimination is
likely to remain primarily in the preserve of the Equality Com-
mission. Policing and police powers are currently under exami-
nation by the Policing Commission and the Criminal Justice re-
view. Emergency legislation remains within the control of the
U.K. government, which has recently indicated an intention to
introduce permanent anti-terrorist law throughout the United
Kingdom even if it withdraws the emergency legislation that ap-
plies to Northern Ireland." 9 The Human Rights Commission
will no doubt wish to contribute to the discussions of the Polic-
ing Commission and the proposals for anti-terrorist law, but its
formal position in relation to these is no stronger than that of
SACHR.
What the Commission can do is to strive to ensure that the
Agreement's commitments to the protection of human rights be-
come part of the wiring of all public institutions in Northern
Ireland. To achieve this, it must adopt a much higher public
119. See Straw Launches Broader Laws Against Terrorism, GUARDIAN, Dec. 18, 1998.
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profile than was the case with SACHR, something its enlarged
staff and full time Chief Commissioner should help it to achieve.
Although the Northern Ireland Act does not confer upon it a
clear power to advise other public authorities, the Commission
should seek to make full use of its powers to facilitate human
rights education, to advise the Secretary of State, to support liti-
gation, and to undertake investigations with the overall objective
of ensuring that bodies such as the police, prison service, and
government departments fully respect human rights. It should
seek to establish close relations with related bodies such as the
Equality Commission, Policing Ombudsman, Parades Commis-
sion, and Commissioner for Complaints to ensure that human
rights norms are fully integrated into their practices. To the ex-
tent that this is true, the Human Rights Commission may be able
to reduce the amount of work that it has to do. The powers to
indicate that Assembly legislation is inconsistent with human
rights obligations and to support challenges to the actions of
public authorities in Northern Ireland should give it considera-
bly more leverage to achieve this objective than SACHR ever
had. Even in respect of legislation passed by the Westminster
government or decisions made by civil servants answerable to the
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, where the Commission's
formal powers are weaker, it can still make use of its investiga-
tion and litigation powers to engineer greater compliance.
Whether this will prove sufficient to produce change may de-
pend on whether the approach that it espouses receives suffi-
cient support from courts, which in Northern Ireland and Brit-
ain, have not always shown themselves to be sympathetic to
human rights arguments. 120
SACHR constantly found its legitimacy under threat as it
lacked the organizational structure to distance itself from gov-
ernment sufficiently or the powers to make an impact on govern-
ment. A more active and effective Human Rights Commission is
likely to find itself facing legitimacy problems from a different
direction. Agencies that do manage to impose themselves effec-
tively on state institutions are vulnerable to the claim that they
120. On the Northern Irish courts record, see Brice Dickson, Northern Ireland's
Troubles and the Judges, in NORTHERN IRELAND: POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 130
(Brigid Hadfield ed., 1992). For the approach of the House of Lords, the final domes-
tic appeal court for Northern Ireland, see Stephen Livingstone, The House of Lords and
the Northern Ireland Conflict, 57 Moo. L. REv. 333 (1994).
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are unrepresentative quangos who are frustrating the will of the
electorate. 121 If the Commission's membership does turn out to
be sufficiently "representative of the community in Northern Ire-
land," then some of the force of such criticisms may be de-
flected. However, the Commission can also argue that it is more
than just another quango. Rather, along with the Equality Com-
mission, it can be seen as having a key constitutional role in giv-
ing effect to the human rights and equality provisions that are
central to the Agreement and hence to the future government
of Northern Ireland. The inclusion of these provisions in the
Northern Ireland Act is a clear indication that Northern Ireland
has moved a long way from the traditional British constitutional
themes of parliamentary sovereignty and the absence of substan-
tive legal limits on government power.' 22 Instead, Northern Ire-
land's constitution now recognizes that its form of democracy
includes some limits on the power of majorities. To the extent
that the Human Rights Commission plays a role in making these
limits effective, it is developing rather than denying democracy.
One of the Australian Human Rights Commission's most
important activities to date was to hold public hearings, which
exposed major problems in Australia's mental health care sys-
tem. This led to significant legislative reform. 123 Matters such as
the care of the mentally ill, unlike claims of discrimination or
police malpractice, often do not enjoy a high level of political
and media visibility. Arguably, it is these on which a Human
Rights Commission should focus as others already have sufficient
advocates. In Northern Ireland, as elsewhere in the world, there
are issues such as the treatment of children and immigrants that
badly require serious examination from a human rights perspec-
tive. In time the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission
may even come to do its most important work in these fields.
However, if it fails to have an impact on the more politically con-
troversial issues of human rights, which are at the heart of the
Agreement, then it may never gain the authority that will enable
it to do so.
121. See CAROL HARLOW & RICHARD RAWLINGS, LAW AND ADMINISTRATION 307-12
(2d ed. 1997).
122. For critiques of the Westminster models as applied to Northern Ireland, see
MORISON & LIVINGSTONE, supra note 69, at 89-120, and McCrudden, supra note 18, at
341-44.
123. See SPENCFR & BYNOE, supra note 15, at 59.
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